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Is functional cooperation with authoritarian regimes a blessing or a curse for democratiza-
tion? Scholars predominantly view cooperation with authoritarian regimes as counterproductive
in terms of democratization because it helps the incumbent government to remain in power by sta-
bilizing the regime. This article presents evidence to suggest that functional cooperation can also
be considered a promising way of yielding subtle processes of democratization that have hitherto
been overlooked. It explores to what extent state officials become acquainted with democratic gov-
ernance by participating in transgovernmental policy networks, notably the Twinning Program, set
up by the European Union in order to implement functional cooperation with its Southern neigh-
borhood. The study conducts regression analyses based on original survey data on Moroccan state
officials’ attitudes toward democratic governance and complements these analyses with a qualita-
tive comparison of different networks. The findings corroborate an optimistic reading of functional
cooperation. By significantly shaping the attitudes toward democratic governance of involved state
officials, cooperation appears to be able to plant seeds of change inside authoritarian regimes.
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Introduction 
In light of the resilience of stable authoritarian regimes, a new line of research 
warns that the global waves of democratization may have ebbed away. Scholars 
have consequently started to explore determinants of ‘authoritarian consolidation’ 
(Burnell and Schlumberger 2010; Göbel and Lambach 2009; Brownlee 2007; 
Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Leib and He 2006). In this perspective, the capacity 
to maintain authoritarian rule without resorting to coercion but with a certain 
degree of responsiveness to domestic problems is considered key to the survival 
of non-democratic regimes. Authoritarian rulers are particularly interested in 
coping with social and economic grievances as these are perceived as threats to 
the regime’s stability. Problems of governance provide incentives for opening up 
to functional cooperation with economically and politically liberalized countries, 
hoping for effective solutions to current challenges. Drawing upon this, problem-
specific cooperation is considered counterproductive in terms of democratization 
because it helps authoritarian regimes to remain in power by generating output 
legitimacy and preserving regime stability (Harders 2008; Schlumberger 2006; 
Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). 
This article takes a different view by considering functional cooperation 
as staging a site of socialization. Rather than exploring the effect cooperation 
might yield at the level of the regime, it wishes to open the black box of micro-
processes in action where cooperation is actually implemented. More precisely, 
this article looks at transgovernmental networks which implement functional 
cooperation between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes. It examines 
the effect of participation in these networks on the attitudes of the state officials 
involved toward democratic governance. The focus on socialization separates 
attitudes from behavior. This allows a statement to be made as to whether 
functional cooperation can induce attitude change toward democratic governance, 
even if it has not translated into effective regime change. The results reveal that 
functional cooperation indeed yields subtle processes of democratic socialization 
that have hitherto been disregarded. In light of the ongoing debate about whether 
a strategy of isolation or one of rapprochement should be pursued by the 
international community when dealing with non-democratic states, the findings 
highlight the importance of improving our knowledge of the indirect effects of 
functional cooperation.  
The potential democratizing impact of functional cooperation is 
examined in an empirical study of Arab state officials that are/were involved in 
transgovernmental policy networks set up and financed by the European Union 
(EU) in the framework of its association policy toward the Southern 
neighborhood. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) aims to approximate 
legal and bureaucratic standards in neighboring countries to those of the Union as 
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a means to manage interdependence and foster integration below membership at 
the level of sectors (Freyburg et al. 2009). Albeit cooperation predominantly 
focuses on the export of substantial rules, these standards incorporate procedural 
elements of democratic governance since they were developed for EU Member 
States that are established democracies. These procedural rules can find their way 
into administrative practices and legal provisions as a consequence of 
cooperation. The actual work of implementing functional cooperation is done in 
transgovernmental networks that bring together specialists from both established 
democratic and non-democratic countries. While participating in the activities of 
these networks, state officials employed in a non-democratic polity may become 
acquainted with democratic principles of decision making. In this vein, 
cooperation can unleash the potential for subtle democratization processes that are 
initially quite autonomous from regime-level democratization. In the long run, 
however, democratization of administrative governance may potentially spill over 
into the general polity. When bureaucratic and societal actors become acquainted 
with democratic norms and practices and begin to implement them and make a 
claim for them in the administrative reality, it might prompt a dynamic creating a 
demand for far-reaching democratization of the entire political system. 
In order to scrutinize democratic socialization through functional 
cooperation, an approach is adopted that is empirically and methodologically 
innovative. Empirically, it enriches research on socialization by exploring the 
argument in a novel context. Existing research largely concentrates on processes 
that either occur within international and regional organizations (Kerr 1973; 
Checkel 2003; Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005; Scully 2005) or are triggered by them, 
predominantly in Central and Eastern Europe after the implosion of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War (Flockhart 2004; Gheciu 2005; 
Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). The present study endeavors to introduce functional 
cooperation as a site of socialization into trans-national norms. It takes 
transgovernmental networks that are created to implement the EU’s reform policy 
toward its Southern neighborhood as its example. At the time of this study most 
countries in the regions of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) display a 
unique combination of authoritarianism and strong statehood that makes them 
“least-likely” cases for efforts to promote successful democracy from the outside. 
Hence, the attitudes of domestic actors toward democratic governance are likely 
to be negative, and the potential effects of democratic socialization can be better 
differentiated from domestic trends since these effects are unlikely to happen in 
the absence of external influences. Methodologically, this study invests in directly 
examining attitudes rather than inferring them from behavior. To this end, it 
develops an original scale that measures the degree of agreement with democratic 
norms of governance, and explores self-collected data based on an original survey 
among 150 Moroccan state officials. Interpretation of the regression results is 
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strengthened by data collected on the basis of 69 interviews that I conducted with 
governmental and non-governmental policy-makers, Commission officials, 
representatives of international organizations, journalists, and scientists in 
Morocco, Berlin, Vienna and Brussels in 2007 and 2008. 
In the first section I develop the theoretical background to the link 
between functional cooperation and democratic socialization. In the subsequent 
section the methodology is specified. Section three provides empirical evidence 
for the argument and explores the conditions under which democratic 
socialization can be observed. The results support the argument that functional 
cooperation with authoritarian regimes can have a democratizing side effect on 
the attitudes of the domestic actors involved. 
THEORY: Democratic Socialization and Functional Cooperation 
Research on international socialization can be classified along three axes: the role 
of international institutions in socialization, the substance and then the target of 
socialization. First, whereas some scholars see institutions primarily as norm 
promoters trying to influence the preferences and attitudes of actors with the help 
of various instruments and strategies (Risse et al. 1999; Finnemore 1993), others 
follow a more structuralist perspective (Checkel 2005); they consider institutions 
as sites of socialization in which participating actors internalize trans-national 
norms as a consequence of social interaction and cooperation (Johnston 2001). 
Second, socialization itself refers to the process of inducting those being 
socialized into trans-national norms such as human rights (Risse et al. 1999) and 
democracy (Flockhart 2004; Gheciu 2005), but it can also concern the actors’ 
identities. In the latter case, scholars’ main question is in what way membership 
of an international organization matters, in the sense that being part of the 
respective organization becomes a factor for identity building (Hooghe 2005; 
Scully 2005; Kerr 1973). Third, socialization can be conceptualized at both the 
macro-level of states and state governments and the micro-level of individuals, 
such as members of a parliament or as national representatives of international 
organizations. 
Whereas studies viewing institutions as promoters largely concentrate on 
socialization into the trans-national norms of states, the other strand of research 
that refers to institutions as sites of socialization predominantly examines the 
transformation of the identity of individuals delegated to international 
organizations. This article integrates both perspectives by showing that 
individuals can also become socialized into trans-national norms by being 
embedded in international institutions (see the shaded area in Table 1). It views 
transgovernmental policy networks between the administrations of liberal 
democracies and authoritarian regimes as a site for the socialization of individuals 
into democratic norms. 
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Table 1. Approaches to International Socialization  
 Socialization through 
international institutions 
Socialization in 
international institutions 
Role of international 
institutions in 
socialization 
Actors/Promoters Site 
Substance of socialization 
in/through international 
institutions 
Trans-national norms, 
e.g. democracy, human 
rights 
International/European 
identity 
Target of socialization 
in/through international 
socialization 
Nation-states Individuals 
 
The efforts invested in theoretically and methodologically complex studies on 
international socialization result in only modest (if any) positive empirical 
findings (Checkel 2005; Schimmelfennig 2003; Pollack 1998).1 Why should we 
still expect democratic socialization to occur even in “hard cases” such as the 
mindset of state officials employed in Arab authoritarian regimes? First, attitude 
change toward democratic administrative governance does not imply changes of 
loyalty or identity touching upon the core of an individual’s personality. Instead, 
it refers to norms that belong to the professional realm of state officials. Second, 
democratic norms of governance as politically sensitive norms are not directly 
promoted but introduced through professional exchange within the framework of 
functional cooperation. Third, concentrating on attitude change allows for the 
capture of subliminal external influences since functional cooperation may shape 
the attitudes of domestic actors toward democratic governance but may not trigger 
behavioral realization in view of the likely repressive consequences. In this vein, 
this study complements existing research on socialization by examining subtle 
processes that have been neglected so far. 
The theoretical argument proceeds as follows. Functional cooperation 
between the EU and its authoritarian neighbors is translated into action by 
transgovernmental policy networks. Policy networks are understood as ‘cluster[s] 
of actors, each of which has an interest, or “stake” in a given […] policy sector 
and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure’ (Peterson and 
                                                            
1 Exceptions are the positive findings of Gheciu (2005) and Flockhart’s (2004) study on the 
socialization into democratic norms and practices of national agents from Eastern candidate states. 
Even though the socialization promoted by NATO took place in the shadow of the perspective of 
membership, their findings point in a more optimistic direction. 
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Bomberg 1999: 8). Transgovernmental policy networks, in turn, are described as 
‘pattern[s] of regular and purposive relations among like government units 
working across the borders that divide countries from one another and that 
demarcate the “domestic” from the “international” sphere’ (Slaughter 2004: 14). 
According to this view, transgovernmental means relaxing the assumption that a 
nation-state acts as an unitary actor. Instead, it suggests considering the 
emergence of networks that are initiated at an intermediate level between 
government and society and that operate among sub-units of governments ‘when 
they act relatively autonomously from higher authority in international politics’ 
(Keohane and Nye 1974: 41). These networks constitute a site of socialization; 
specialists from the administrations of EU Member States and neighboring 
countries are teamed together in order to generate and execute policy solutions 
based on EU legal and administrative standards. Given that the rules to be 
transferred were developed by established democracies, they envelop provisions 
of democratic governance (Freyburg et al. 2009). Moreover, it is assumed that 
European bureaucrats will apply and impart democratic governance when serving 
as experts abroad because of their professional socialization in democratic 
polities. Based on what they consider to be appropriate governance, they may 
address issues suppressed in national discourse, such as the participation of non-
state actors in administrative decision making and the availability of information 
to the public. By participating in cooperative activities, their ENP counterparts 
can thus become acquainted with democratic practices of administrative 
governance unknown under authoritarian rule. All things considered, the EU’s 
approach of establishing functional cooperation with non-democratic non-member 
countries might be ‘capable of unleashing a dynamic of socialization around 
democratic norms’ (Youngs 2001: 360). 
Socialization into Democratic Governance 
Democratic socialization is defined as a process of attitude change toward 
democratic governance which emerges here as a consequence of exposure to the 
democratic rules and practices of administrative decision making.2 It is, among 
others, present to the degree that individuals change their attitudes toward 
democratic norms as a consequence of experiences in policy networks which are 
not aimed at promoting democracy in the first place. The notion of democratic 
governance used here corresponds to the manifestation of democratic principles in 
administrative daily practices. It adopts the idea that democratic principles may be 
applicable to every situation in which collectively binding decisions are taken 
                                                            
2 This definition largely corresponds to the classical understanding of socialization as a ‘process of 
inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community’ (Checkel 2005: 804). For a 
discussion of alternative definitions, see Pollack (1998) and Johnston (2001: 494-5). 
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(Beetham 1999: 4-5; cf., Dahl 1971: 12). These principles can thus be translated 
into administrative rules and practices at the level of sub-units of state 
administration, even within a non-democratic polity. Unlike good governance 
(Kaufmann et al. 2005), democratic governance is not about how effectively and 
efficiently but how legitimately ‘the rules of the political game are managed’ 
(Hyden et al. 2004: 2; cf. Coston 1998). Governance-driven democratization 
increases the chances that those affected by collective decisions made at the 
administrative level will have some chance to influence those decisions.  
For the purpose of assessing state officials’ attitudes toward democratic 
modes of decision making, a multidimensional concept of democratic governance 
is used. Democratic governance may vary in quality along three dimensions: 
transparency, accountability and participation (Freyburg et al. 2007; cf. Bovens 
2007; Hyden et al. 2004; Brinkerhoff 2000). Transparency is about the provision 
of, and access to, various kinds of information for the general public 
(Zaharchenko and Goldenman 2004). Accountability at the administrative level 
refers to the obligation for officials to justify the use of resources and the 
achievement of outcomes toward citizens and independent third parties, and the 
establishment and application of procedures for administrative review, including 
the possibility of sanctions in the case of infringement (Grant and Keohane 2005: 
29; Diamond et al. 1999: 3). Finally, participation largely corresponds to the key 
feature of the conventional understanding of democracy at the level of the nation-
state (Dahl 1971; Verba 1967). Transferred to administrative governance, 
participation means that all willing members of the public should have an equal 
and effective opportunity to make their interests and concerns known, thereby 
shaping the outcome of the decisions. Although the margins between these 
dimensions are sometimes blurred, they are analyzed individually. This not only 
allows for the exploration of whether some dimensions of democratic governance 
are more open to socialization than others; functional cooperation also places 
emphasis on different dimensions of democratic governance in different sectors. 
Whereas the involvement of concerned citizens and interested non-state actors is, 
for instance, especially stressed in cooperation on environmental matters, the 
establishment of an independent control authority ensuring accountable 
governance is particularly emphasized in the field of competition. 
Hypotheses to be Tested 
The idea that policy-oriented cooperation between public administrations of 
liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes may trigger processes of 
democratic socialization is based on the assumption that social interaction and 
exchange among peers matters. Participation in transgovernmental networks is 
expected to positively shape attitudes toward democratic governance. In this 
sense, the overall hypothesis reads: 
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H1: State officials who have been involved in transgovernmental networks 
have a more positive attitude toward democratic governance than their non-
participating colleagues (cooperation). 
 
The corresponding null hypothesis is that participation in transgovernmental 
networks has no significant impact on attitudes toward democratic governance. 
First, scholars of political socialization usually consider socialization into 
fundamental political orientations as driven entirely by domestic conditions. 
Moreover, they argue that these orientations are developed early and remain fairly 
stable during their existence (Searing et al. 1976; Marsh 1971; Dawson and 
Prewitt 1969). Second, according to rational choice theorists, cooperation can 
change only the ranking of the actors’ preferences but not the preferences and 
underlying identities and attitudes as such (Fearon and Wendt 2003: 62-5; 
Moravcsik 1993).  
The democratizing potential of participation in transgovernmental 
networks might depend on other trans-national influences. Studies on the 
diffusion of democratic norms point to the distinguished role of exchange 
programs and foreign media in transferring democratic norms to non-democratic 
states. Whereas exchange programs allow citizens of non-democratic states to 
experience democratic decision making firsthand in a democratic country 
(Atkinson 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Nye 2004), foreign media 
broadcasts delineate democratic practices beyond borders (Kern and Hainmueller 
2009; Way and Levitsky 2007; Wejnert 2005; Whitehead 1996). Consequently, 
state officials employed in a non-democratic polity have had experiences with 
democratic governance before they enter transgovernmental networks. Studies on 
international socialization identify this ‘primacy effect’ (Hooghe 2005: 866) as 
crucial for socialization to occur. State officials who have had prior experiences 
with democratic governance are expected to be more disposed to changing their 
attitudes toward this when they are re-exposed to democratic governance 
(Johnston 2001: 497; Checkel 2001: 563). Drawing on this reasoning, it is 
hypothesized that at least one of the conditions outlined needs to be satisfied 
before functional cooperation is sufficient to bring about its socializing effect. 
Participation in transgovernmental networks is more likely to impact 
positively on the attitudes toward democratic governance of state officials 
who … 
H2a … have stayed abroad for educational or professional reasons in a 
Western democratic country (stay abroad); 
H2b … regularly use Western media for political information (foreign 
media). 
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The two trans-national influences – foreign media and a stay abroad – are 
introduced in the analyses as both independent factors and interaction terms with 
participation in a trans-national network.  
RESEARCH DESIGN: Measuring the Attitude toward Democratic 
Governance 
This study applies a sequential mixed-method design complementing quantitative 
research with a qualitative study (Morse 2002) in order to explore the 
democratizing effect of functional cooperation. The first step is quantitative as 
multiple regression analyses are used to examine, in consecutive order, the 
association of explanatory variables relating to the properties of the state officials 
with each of the three dimensions of democratic governance and the overall 
concept. In other words, regression analyses are run separately for transparency, 
accountability and participation, and for democratic governance as such. The 
analyses are first conducted entering this study’s key variable – participation in a 
Twinning project (‘cooperation’) – as a dichotomous variable measuring whether 
the individual state official was involved in a project or not. Subsequently, the 
analyses are repeated by using dummies for the individual projects. Because of its 
robustness to non-normality of continuous data, the analysis is done with a 
Maximum Likelihood parameter estimator (MLMV) that provides estimates with 
standard errors and mean- and variance-adjusted Chi-square test statistics (Brown 
2006: 379; Muthén and Muthén 2006: 426).3 In a second step the individual 
Twinning projects are systematically compared in order to explore what 
properties of transgovernmental networks facilitate democratic socialization. 
Whereas multiple regression analyses for the individual Twinning projects enable 
us to detect differences in norm transfer between individual projects, subsequent 
qualitative comparison is used to explain these differences.  
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
EU functional cooperation in the neighborhood can take different shapes. 
Environmental cooperation in Morocco, for instance, used to be implemented by 
regional programs such as the Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental 
Action Program (SMAP) in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, the trans-national LIFE-third countries program established by the 
Sixth Action Program for the Environment, or multilateral platforms such as the 
Mediterranean component of the EU Water Initiative (EUWI). The ENP 
introduced new instruments of bilateral administrative interchange, notably the 
short-term Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Program (TAIEX), 
                                                            
3 The MLMV estimation is based on a MLM estimation that corresponds to Satorra-Bentler chi-
square statistics. 
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providing targeted expert assistance, and the long-term Twinning program, a tool 
for cooperation on specific policy issues between sub-units of public 
administration.  
The Twinning program is particularly suitable for an examination of the 
potential democratizing effect of functional cooperation (European Court of 
Auditors 2003; Cooper and Johansen 2003: 6-7; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 
2003: 631). First, Twinning projects are an administrative reality as they are part 
of governance within the administration. They aim at modernizing the 
departments that benefit through training and reorganization as well as by drafting 
laws and regulations modeled on the EU acquis. The policy solutions offered thus 
incorporate elements of democratic governance. Second, in contrast to alternative 
policy reform programs, Twinning projects are based on intensive working 
relations on a day-to-day basis for a considerable period of time. This not only 
helps to build relationships based on trust and mutual understanding, but also 
familiarizes state officials with democratic administrative practices. Third, all 
projects follow the same tight and formalized structure, which makes them 
comparable. At the same time, they are issue-specific and show significant 
differences with regard to properties such as the number of departments to benefit 
and the degree of politicization of the policy issues concerned. Since there is no 
more than one project in any single sub-unit of public administration, the effects 
of these properties can be isolated; the effect of alternative cooperation programs 
is controlled. Finally, possible interfering effects of selective recruitment (Hooghe 
2005; Pollack 1998; Kerr 1973) can be assumed to be marginal. In most cases, 
every state official working in a department that benefits was involved in at least 
one of the various activities.4 The appointment as a participant in the individual 
activities of a Twinning project is decided on the basis of objective criteria, such 
as the field of responsibility in the department and professional performance 
rather than on personal contacts and loyalty. 5  In the rare event of non-
participation of individual state officials, absence was primarily due to the fact 
that there was (hitherto) no activity in the respective field of responsibility or that 
the official could not make it to the session. 
                                                            
4 Consequently, only a few officials were able to experience an indirect socialization effect of 
functional cooperation due to exchange with immediate colleagues involved in a Twinning 
project. 
5 The survey among state officials covers the question ‘How important do you think the following 
factors were for your own appointment as a participant in the Twinning project?‘ The following 
possible categories for a response are: ‘international experience’, ‘language skills’, ‘education’, 
‘previous work with the person in charge’, ‘personality’, ‘professional performance’, ‘personal 
contacts’, ‘field of responsibility in department’, measured on a 5-point Likert agreement scale. 
The same question is included in a survey among the European bureaucrats that served as 
Twinning experts in Morocco. Responses are complemented by interviews with Twinning 
participants and project leaders/experts. Descriptive statistics can be obtained from the author. 
9
Freyburg: Functional Cooperation and Democratic Socialization
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
 
 
The effect of participation in Twinning activities on the attitude toward 
democratic governance is examined by taking the example of Morocco. Morocco 
belongs to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which consists of 
authoritarian regimes that – until recently – experienced no noteworthy, genuinely 
endogenous democratization processes. Figure 1 displays the values Freedom 
House provides for each Arab country in the period of 2000 to 2008. The figure 
clearly demonstrates that even Morocco and Jordan, which are widely referred to 
as the most politically liberalized countries in the Arab world, still belong to the 
group of authoritarian regimes. Jordan and Morocco are the only countries that 
Freedom House has consistently ranked as “partly free”. For 2000-08 their 
combined ratings of political rights and civil liberties are 4.7 on average. A 
minimum degree of openness can thus be expected (Al-Arkoubi and McCourt 
2004: 983; Mohamedou 1999: 211), which enhances the likelihood that 
administrative cooperation will induce democratic socialization. 
Furthermore, as a bureaucratic monarchy Morocco’s political system is 
characterized by traditional paternalistic structures that attach great importance to 
state bureaucracy for the maintenance and stability of the regime (Pawelka 2002; 
Zerhouni 2004). Moreover, Morocco was among the first Southern neighboring 
countries to sign the ENP Action Plan and to initiate Twinning projects. Today it 
enjoys a privileged status (statut avancé) within the ENP. If participation in 
transgovernmental networks impacts on the attitudes of state officials in 
neighboring authoritarian regimes, then we should be able to detect such an effect 
in the case of EU Twinning programs in Morocco. In turn, in the case of a 
negative finding it is acceptable to conclude that if less institutionalized and 
located in countries politically less liberalized, administrative cooperation will 
show no significant effect. 
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Figure 1. Political Rights and Civil Liberties in the Arab World, 2000-2008 
Descriptive statistics. Freedom House classifies countries whose combined 
average value of political rights and civil liberties falls between 3.0 and 5.5 as 
“partly free” and between 5.5 and 7.0 as “not free”. The average value for 
Algeria constantly lies at 5.5; the line is overlapped by the lines for Lebanon 
(2000-04) and Egypt (2004-08). 
 
To measure the attitudes toward democratic governance of Moroccan state 
officials a closed-end questionnaire was constructed entitled Administrative Rules 
and Practices in Public Administration in Morocco. The respondents were 
selected by a theoretically controlled cluster sampling: all officials working in 
particular departments of certain ministries were invited to fill in the 
questionnaire. Personal distribution, on site, of the questionnaire to the state 
officials enabled a response rate of approximately 96 per cent.6 An almost full 
                                                            
6 Thanks to the opportunity given to leave inconvenient questions blank, to guaranteed anonymity 
and to the persuasive approach taken, outright refusal was almost absent. Only one official flatly 
refused to fill in the questionnaire; fewer than five officials could not be reached because of 
professional commitments abroad or holidays. It is difficult to test sample bias conclusively 
because socio-demographic data on state officials in Morocco are not available. Respondents 
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survey of the selected departments was important in order to ensure that it was not 
only specific, for instance pro-European-minded officials, that filled in the 
questionnaire. Two groups of officials are equally covered: officials that 
participated in a Twinning project (N = 85) and officials that are employed in a 
thematically related department in a ministry not targeted by a Twinning project 
(N = 65).7 The difference in attitude between these two groups is ascribed to the 
effects of participation, while including explicit controls for the relevant 
properties of the state officials (quasi-experimental ‘static group comparison’, 
Campbell and Stanley 1966: 12). The ‘fundamental problem of causal inference’ 
(Holland 1986) is that for each respondent we never get to observe both potential 
outcomes but only the realized ones. In other words, for a respondent participating 
in an EU Twinning project, we never get to observe the counterfactual level of 
attitude toward democratic governance that she would have had if she had not 
participated in the project (and vice versa). To obtain an unbiased treatment it is 
therefore crucial to find a suitable control group that is sufficiently similar to the 
group under examination in all relevant characteristics except that it was not 
exposed to Twinning activities. 
The Dependent Variables 
Since this study could not build on existing surveys, it required the creation of 
suitable democratic governance items in order to measure the dependent 
variables, in other words the attitudes of state officials toward democratic 
governance. The three theoretically derived dimensions of democratic governance 
– transparency, accountability and participation – are operationalized with issue 
indicators pertaining to various aspects of administrative decision making. 
Conceptual work on public administration (reform), and the linking of (good) 
governance and development, inspired their formulation (Hyden et al. 2004; 
Baker 2002; Page 1985; Berger 1957). All items were measured using a 5-point 
Likert scale on agreement responses. To minimize the risk of response tendencies, 
the statement items were randomly distributed in two out of 36 different sets of 
questions8, some of the items appear reformulated in different statements, and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
could choose the language of communication (French or Arabic)); 9 per cent  picked the Arabic 
version. 
7 Due to this specific and limited nature of the target group, the questionnaire was cognitively pre-
tested by knowledgeable experts (Collins 2003; Presser et al. 2004) – psychologists and political 
scientists specializing in Arab authoritarian regimes – and colleagues with Arab backgrounds. 
8 The two sets of questions are introduced as follows: ‘There are different understandings of what 
determines the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts in public 
administration. To what extent do you personally agree that the following items serve this 
function?’ (item 7+8) / ‘There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a ‘good’ civil servant. 
To what extent to you personally agree or disagree that a civil servant should have the following 
qualities?’ (item 1-6). 
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some capture statements on features of non-democratic governance (negatively-
oriented items).  
Despite the precautions taken in questionnaire design and survey setting, 
the existence of preference falsification cannot be completely ruled out. Yet, I am 
not primarily interested in identifying the true understanding of appropriate 
governance among Arab state officials. Instead, I am concerned with estimating 
the difference in agreement with democratic governance between state officials 
who participated in transgovernmental networks and those who did not. It can 
essentially be assumed that there is no systematic bias of response tendencies; a 
socialization effect can therefore not be ascribed to the effect of response 
tendencies. 
 
Table 2. Three Dimensions of Attitude toward Democratic Governance 
Participation  
1 ‘A civil servant should take into account the views and concerns of affected 
citizens before making decisions’  
2 ‘A civil servant should offer updated information on governmental policy’  
3 ‘A civil servant should ensure that the citizens’ views and concerns have an 
influence on shaping policies’  
n ‘A civil servant should always seek to bring the public into accordance with 
governmental policy’  
Transparency  
4 ‘A civil servant should work in a manner that is transparent and 
comprehensible for the general public’  
5 ‘A civil servant should provide citizens with the possibility of advancing 
their views as an input for governmental decision making’  
6 ‘A civil servant should make information available to anyone requesting it’  
n  ‘A civil servant should assure that all information held by public authority 
remains in the hands of the government only’  
Accountability  
7 ‘Monitoring by independent state institutions ensures the appropriateness 
and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts’  
8 ‘Possibilities for the general public and its associations to request scrutiny 
of  the decision-making process and review of policies ensures the 
appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts’  
n ‘Instructions of and approval by the higher authority ensures the 
appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts’  
n = negatively-oriented item. 
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Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) helped to identify the items that are most 
suitable for measuring attitude toward democratic governance in its three 
dimensions.9 Table 2 displays the exact wording of the items. It is run only on the 
positively-oriented items. Due to a non-response rate of about ten per cent to the 
three negatively-oriented items, their number of missing values is comparatively 
high. Their incorporation would have disproportionally decreased the number of 
cases and thus led to a substantial loss of information on the regular items. Based 
on the theoretical idea that a true democrat is one who supports items of regular 
democratic governance and rejects their logical opposites, the dependent variables 
are assessed using scales that aggregate the positively-oriented items and the 
negatively-oriented item. The items used for each scale are the positively-oriented 
items with a factor loading of .40 or more in the factor analysis (Worthington and 
Whittaker 2006: 823) and the theoretically corresponding negatively-oriented 
item. Scales were constructed by adding values of individual item values and 
dividing the sum by the number of items for each dimension. The overall concept 
of democratic governance is measured by the mean of the three individual 
scales.10 
The distribution of the outcome variables is shown in Figure 2 (for 
descriptive statistics see Annex Ia). The boxes show the middle values of the 
dependent variables (50 per cent of the data) with the black line indicating the 
median value, while the ends of the vertical lines (‘whiskers’) stretch to the 
greatest and lowest value of these variables. The dashed line represents the mean 
                                                            
9 The exploratory factor analysis is done using the robust mean and variance-adjusted weighted 
least squares (WLSMV) extraction procedure and the oblique rotation method, Oblimin. The exact 
factor loadings are provided in Annex II.  
10 EFA enables to determine items that are suitable to create scales with high internal consistency, 
as corroborated by each scale’s internal reliability. The point estimate for the scale reliability (ρ) 
of participation is .79 (three items), of accountability .58 (two items) and of transparency .75 
(three items), if Raykov’s confirmatory FA-based method is applied. This approach is not only 
insensitive to the violation of the assumption of normality but also presents a more accurate 
estimate of the reliability of multi-items measures than the usual Cronbach’s alpa (though the 
value of the expressions is identical) (Sijtsma 2009; Raykov 2007; Brown 2006: 337-45). 
Cronbach’s α of participation is .68, of accountability .38 and of transparency .46. Given the 
exploratory character of this study, its objective (attitudes and preferences) and the small number 
of items per scale, the reliabilialty of the individual scales is still acceptable if the theoretically 
corresponding negatively-oriented item is added to each scale (cf. John and Benet-Martinéz 2000: 
346). Since these items could not be introduced in the EFA, Cronbach’s alpha has to be used 
instead of the more reliable approach of Raykov. Cronbach’s alpha is .61 for participation, .14 for 
accountability and .30 for transparency. The lower values reflect the advice not to combine 
regularly-worded and reverse-scored items in one single scale since doing so might impair 
reliability of measurement and thus absorb the desired reduction of response biases (cf. 
Schriesheim et al. 1991; Pilotte and Gable 1990). I cross-checked the validity of this study’s 
results by running the regression analyses on separate scales for the positively- and negatively-
oriented items; the estimation results are similar and can be obtained from the author. 
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value of democratic governance as overall category (right box). Since a few 
outliers are present, as indicated by the points, the whiskers extend to a maximum 
of 1.5 times the inter-quartile range. 
Figure 2. Attitude toward Democratic Governance 
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Box plot. Values range between 1 (non-democratic) to 5 (democratic); N = 110, 
cases with missing values excluded listwise.  
Variables Introduced in the Regression Analyses (‘Properties of the actors to be 
socialized’) 
The key independent variable of my analysis is participation in a Twinning 
project (‘cooperation’). It is coded as a binary variable with a value of 1 if an 
official participates/d in a Twinning project. The model is completed by 
introducing two alternative explanatory factors and two control variables that 
characterize the individual state official. 
As alternative explanatory factors I enter two variables – a ‘stay abroad’ 
in a Western democracy and the use of ‘foreign media’ e – that have attracted 
increased attention in their capacity to transfer democratic norms into non-
democratic states. They are both introduced as independent and modifying 
variables to cooperation.11 The use of foreign media applies to Western print 
                                                            
11 The regression analysis is re-run for alternative codings, e.g. separate categories for television 
and print media without statistically significant differences. The least complex solution is applied. 
 
       Participation        Transparency        Accountability      Democratic 
       Governance 
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media (newspaper and magazines) and television channels that are used for 
political information (rather than as a source of entertainment).12 Respondents 
were asked to indicate which newspaper/magazines and television channels they 
read and watch for political information, in which languages, and how often they 
do so. Since media products originate predominantly in Europe – about 97 per 
cent of foreign print media and 94 per cent of foreign TV channels used – the 
expected influence of this link through communication can be said to be 
European. Media penetration is treated as dichotomous with ‘1’ representing 
regular media usage. ‘Stay abroad’ refers to the international experience of 
officials, operationalized as a stay abroad for at least six months for educational or 
professional reasons in the ‘old’ Member States of the European Union and/or 
North America (NA). This variable is coded as a binary variable with ‘1’ for 
residence in the EU and/or in the United States/Canada. There are no significant 
differences in attitude toward democratic governance between officials who spent 
a considerable period of time in Europe and those who had been in North America 
or in both host destinations.13 Since the number of visitors to North America is 
very small (N = 9 only NA, N = 6 NA and EU), Europe and North America are 
subsumed into one category. Officials who spent a considerable time in ‘the 
West’ do not substantially consult Western media more often. The two variables 
are not significantly interrelated (see correlation matrix in Annex Ib). 
In addition to the three independent variables, two control variables are 
included in the model: administrative pre-socialization and participation in 
previous programs. Officials that entered the public administration after reform-
oriented forces had taken over the government, and/or that had gained knowledge 
of democratic governance through participation in previous policy reform 
programs set up and implemented by Western donors, are more likely to 
demonstrate a more positive attitude toward democratic governance. This 
proposition accounts for pre-socialization (cf., Beyers 2005; Checkel 2005: 813; 
Johnston 2005; Hooghe 2005). Senior officials in particular – as ‘“well-
connected” members of the old guard’ (Baker 2002: 293) – might perceive 
democratic governance as a real threat to their privileges. Moreover, officials who 
are newly employed in the respective administrative sub-unit are less embedded 
in the prevailing culture of governance, and thus more likely to conform to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Regression results are available upon request. Annex Ib displays descriptive statistics and 
intercorrelation of independent variables. 
12 A recent study on public support for the East German communist regime revealed that if foreign 
media is used primarily as a source of entertainment it may even increase support for the regime 
(Kern and Hainmueller 2009). 
13 A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test comparing the mean ranks for the three dimensions does 
not display any significant differences in attitude toward democratic governance between officials 
that spent time in Europe or in North America (df = 2; χ2 = .310, p = .856 for participation; χ2 = 
1.913, p = .384 for accountability; χ2 = .208, p = .901 for transparency). 
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democratic modes (Checkel 2001: 562; Johnston 2001: 497; Flockhart 2004). 
Administrative socialization is operationalized by the years of professional 
service under the ‘new’ King Mohammed VI, that is more years of service under 
the present than under the previous regime (0), or more years of service under the 
previous regime ruled by King Hassan II (1). The reason for this coding is that the 
political regime during the long reign (1961-99) of King Hassan II was 
characterized by ‘control over both the technocratic state apparatus and the army 
and the police’ (Desrues and Moyano 2001: 21). With the ascension of 
Mohammed VI in 1999 a new spirit of political, social, and economic reform 
entered the country while, at the same time, the real potential for meaningful 
democratic change remained limited (Zerhouni 2004). Participation in previous 
policy reform programs is entered as a binary variable with value of 1 if the 
official participated in at least one program. 46 per cent of the respondents had 
participated in a program set up by development agencies of EU Member States, 
most notably the French Development Agency (AFD) and the German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ); 36 per cent attended activities organized by the World Bank; 
23.2 percent by the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 20 per cent by the Japan International Development Agency (JICA); 
and 18.5 per cent participated in the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP). Earlier participation in policy reform programs other than the EU 
Twinning program constitutes a factor independent from ‘cooperation’ (see 
correlation matrix in Annex Ib). Again, variables are entered as constitutive and 
interaction terms. 
Features Used in Comparative Analysis (‘Properties of the policy networks as 
sites of socialization’) 
It is expected that not only the properties of individual state officials but also the 
properties of the individual transgovernmental networks determine the likelihood 
of socialization into democratic governance. If few departments to benefit are 
involved (‘size’), external experts stay for a long period of time (‘duration’), and 
interaction occurs in ‘less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings’ 
(Checkel 2003: 213), interaction among the participants is more intense and 
trustworthy (Slaughter 2004: 198-200; Checkel 2003: 210; van Waarden 1992; 
Marsden 1990) which, in turn, is expected to make attitude change toward 
democratic governance more likely. These three properties are used to explain 
differences in effect between the individual Twinning projects in Morocco.  
The three variables are operationalized using indirect measures at the 
level of networks rather than identifying values for each individual state official. 
The size of the network is operationalized as the number of departments to benefit 
and the ministries involved. Duration refers to the length of the Twinning project 
in months at the time of the survey. Values for network size and duration are 
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attributed by labeling the highest number of involved units and the longest period, 
respectively, as ‘high’ and, correspondingly, the smallest network and the shortest 
interaction as ‘low’. Networks that fall in between these two categories are 
classified as ‘medium’. Finally, politicization is about the importance of the 
policy issues for the integrity of the state and maintenance of political power by 
the ruling elite. Although transgovernmental policy networks generally operate 
without much publicity and are relatively unaffected by the turbulence of political 
disputes (Pollack 2005: 906; Slaughter 2000: 200-2), functional cooperation is 
still embedded in politics and affected by political interests and power. Interviews 
with Moroccan state officials, journalists and non-governmental activists, as well 
as representatives of international organizations, EU Member States and the 
Delegation of the European Commission, helped to classify the policy issues 
under study as high, medium or low. Indicators are, for example, that media 
coverage is more pluralized and sectoral cooperation is less impeded by political 
considerations. Touching upon internally sensitive issues such as corruption, 
patronage and the mixing of private business with governmental responsibilities, 
and competition policy, for instance, can be regarded as politicized. 
EMPIRICS: EU Functional Cooperation and Democratic Socialization in 
Morocco 
In order to estimate the effect of participation in a Twinning project on the 
attitudes of participating state officials, I calculated four models. In model 1 the 
dependent variables that are the three individual dimensions of democratic 
governance and the overall concept are each regressed on the Twinning variable; 
Model 2 controls in addition for the four explanatory variables that refer to the 
properties of the state officials. In Models 1 and 2 (Hypothesis 1) the interaction 
terms are omitted. In order to test the conditional effects (Hypotheses 2a and 2b), 
I introduce cross-product terms of the Twinning variable and each of the 
explanatory factors as dummies (Brambor et al. 2006; Braumoeller 2004). Table 3 
displays those interaction effects that are significant (Model 3). In the control 
model, the state officials’ properties are regressed alone on the democratic 
governance variables (Model 4). 
The Democratizing Effect of EU Functional Cooperation across all Sectors 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the likelihood of an EU Twinning 
project in shaping the participants’ attitude toward democratic governance. The 
results support the democratizing potential of functional cooperation. They reveal, 
however, that participation in a Twinning project alone does not significantly 
shape the attitudes of the state officials involved (Model 1). The coefficient of 
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cooperation is positive but not significant.14 Hypothesis 1 on the independent 
effect of functional cooperation is to be declined. Interestingly, participation in 
policy reform programs in general has a significant independent effect on attitude 
toward democratic governance. The coefficient of ‘previous programs’ in model 2 
is positive and significant. However, the positive correlation is not necessarily the 
result of attendance but may be that of an accumulation of these programs in less 
politicized fields. 58.4 percent of the projects of the three most important external 
actors of the Western-democratic hemisphere next to the EU and its Member 
States – the United States of America (USAID), the World Bank and Japan – in 
which the responding officials participated, took place in policy fields such as the 
environment, health and education (United States Agency for International 
Development 2011; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
2011). 
Table 3. Results of the Regressions – Democratic Governance 
 (1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4) 
Cooperation .084 
(.074) 
.068 
(.075) 
-.092 
(.095) 
.272 
(.114)* 
 
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.036 
(.073) 
-.042 
(.072) 
-.042 
(.072) 
-.045 
(.074) 
Stay abroad  -.052 
(.075) 
-.251 
(.119)* 
.251 
(.119)* 
-.049 
(.075) 
Foreign media  -.085 
(.092) 
-.055 
(.090) 
-.055 
(.090) 
-.062 
(.089) 
Previous 
programs 
 .217 
(.077)** 
.218 
(.074)** 
.218 
(.074)** 
.221 
(.077)** 
Coop x 1: stay 
abroad 
  .364 
(.148)* 
  
Coop x 1: no stay 
abroad 
   -.364 
(.148)* 
 
R2  .012 .096 .152 .152 .089 
AIC 236.286 764.886 762.090 762.090 623.859 
Log Likelihood -128.643 -375.443 -373.045 -373.045 -305.929 
N 110 103 103 103 103 
Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). Regression coefficients are 
unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; *p ≤ .05, 
**p ≤ .01. 
                                                            
14 This finding supports the observation that participation in a Twinning project is not based on the 
specific properties of the individual officials such as a particularly positive or negative attitude 
toward the EU or democratic principles and as such a possible confounding effect for democratic 
socialization in Twinning projects. 
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In contrast to common wisdom that usage of Western media and international 
education have a democratizing effect, my findings show that state officials who 
have been exposed to these transnational influences are not more open-minded 
about democratic governance. Rather, in both cases the coefficient is even 
(though not significantly) negative (Model 2). While I do not find a significant 
conditional effect of participation in Twinning activities in relation to foreign 
media usage, the coefficient of the interaction term of cooperation and stay abroad 
in Model 3a is positive and statistically significant, as confirmed by a Wald test 
(p=.000; df=3; x2=4793.418). This finding supports Hypothesis 2a but not 
Hypothesis 2b. It seems that the activities of Twinning programs can only 
significantly influence state officials’ understanding of appropriate governance, if 
the officials have already had personal experiences with democratic procedures in 
Western democracies previous to their participation in these activities. If state 
officials had been abroad during their studies, that is before they entered state 
administration, the marginal effect of participation in a Twinning project on the 
attitude of state officials with international experiences is positive (as 
demonstrated by the coefficients in Model 3: -.092+.364=.272; cf. Brambor et al. 
2006: 73). With regard to the effect of transgovernmental networks on the attitude 
toward democratic governance of state officials – and this effect is within the 
focus of the present article – this finding predominantly means that previous 
contact with democratic principles, independently of their evaluation, seems to be 
necessary so that subsequent targeted exchange can refer to already existing 
schemata, and can activate and interpret these cognitive structures.  
The results of the regression on the individual dimensions mirror the 
findings of the regression on democratic governance overall (see Annex III). 
Whereas regression on participatory governance yields a similar pattern of 
significant regression coefficients, the results on accountable and transparent 
governance differ in that the Twinning program produces neither an independent 
nor a conditioning effect. 
The Democratizing Effect of the Individual Twinning Projects 
At the time of this study Morocco benefits from nine Twinning projects that run 
for at least one year.15 Out of these projects, four Twinning projects were selected 
for the empirical analysis: the Twinning project ‘Coordinated Management of the 
Environment and the Harmonization of National Environmental Legislation’ 
(MA04/AA/EN03); the project ‘Development and Implementation of the 
Legislative, Organizational and Technological Means of Ensuring Free 
Commercial Trade at Borders’ (MA04/AA/FI01); the project ‘Support for the 
Strengthening of the Competition Authorities’ (MA06/AA/FI08); and the project 
                                                            
15 A list of the Moroccan projects is available upon request. 
20
World Political Science Review, Vol. 8 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 1
 
 
‘Reinforcement of the Health Control Organizations – Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary’ (MA06/AA/HE06). These four Twinning projects differ with 
regard to the properties identified, notably their size, duration and the degree of 
politicization of the policy field. 
The Twinning project on the environment shows the most favorable 
conditions: a low degree of politicization and a medium-sized network. The 
project ‘Development and Implementation of the Legislative, Organizational and 
Technological Means of Ensuring Free Commercial Trade at Borders’ – the 
Moroccan Customs and Indirect Taxes Administration being the main department 
to benefit – faces a high degree of politicization and a large number of 
departments involved in benefiting from it. Between the range of these two 
projects are the project on competition matters and the project on health control. 
An overview of these properties is given in Table 4. The policy fields of 
competition and customs can be treated as highly politicized, because they touch 
upon internally sensitive issues such as corruption, patronage and the mixing of 
private business with governmental responsibilities. In policy fields providing 
public goods, such as the environment and, albeit to a lesser extent, health control, 
media coverage is more pluralized and transgovernmental cooperation is less 
impeded by political considerations, which are indicators for a lower degree of 
politicization.  
Regression analyses for the individual projects shed light on the 
democratizing potential of the Twinning program. Albeit these analyses overall 
show the same effect of participation in a Twinning project on the condition of a 
stay abroad as the general regression analyses above, they also make it possible to 
reveal the differences between the individual projects (see Annex III). Whereas 
the project on the environment has a significant, independent effect on the 
attitudes toward democratic governance of the officials involved, the projects on 
competition and health control influence these attitudes only significantly if the 
officials involved have stayed abroad prior to their participation in the project. 
The customs project, however, yields neither a significant independent nor 
conditional effect.  
The analysis produces two additional results. First, the effect of 
participation in a Twinning project is sector-related. The attitudes toward the sub-
dimensions of democratic governance are most significantly influenced toward 
the sub-dimension that is most relevant in the particular sub-sector. Second, 
participation in Twinning activities can yield a significant negative effect in some 
policy fields if the state officials use foreign media products for political 
information (Hypothesis 2b).  
Interestingly, Twinning projects shape the participants’ attitudes toward 
the dimension of democratic governance that corresponds best to the projects’ 
sector-specific objectives. The competition project significantly influences 
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attitudes toward accountable governance. This reflects the project’s objective, 
which is the establishment of judicial and administrative procedures to ensure a 
competition control system comparable with that of EU Member States. To this 
end, the project places particular emphasis on the activation and strengthening of 
the Competition Council so that it emerges into an independent control authority. 
It further seeks to ‘ensure the right of appeal to independent courts against anti-
trust decisions’ (European Commission 2004: 23) and a judicial system with 
competent tribunals to judge the decisions adopted by the competition authorities. 
The Twinning project on health control of food for consumers emphasizes 
participation in particular. It aims to strengthen consumer protection by enhancing 
the involvement of consumer associations and producers in the decision making 
on, and implementation of, product quality policy. This project is successful in 
significantly shaping attitudes toward participatory governance. The Twinning 
project on the environment attaches particular importance to the establishment of 
‘procedures concerning access to information and public participation’ (European 
Commission 2004: 36) and even seeks to introduce a Law on Access to 
Environmental Information. It most significantly influences state officials’ 
attitudes toward transparent and participatory governance.  
The effects described in the sector are not independent effects but require 
prior familiarization with democratic governance through a stay abroad in 
Western democracies. Apparently, neither personal practical experience in 
Western democracies abroad nor attendance of Twinning activities is sufficient in 
order to socialize state officials into democratic governance. It seems as if both 
the ‘life’ experience of democratic administrative governance as practiced in 
Western democracies and knowledge imparted in policy reform workshops are 
necessary in order to significantly shape attitudes. An exception is the 
environmental project as it yields a significant independent effect on the state 
officials’ attitudes toward participatory governance. In contrast, the Twinning 
project on customs duty produces no significant democratizing effect, although 
particular importance is attached to accountable governance, especially in terms 
of internal audit and ensuring the appropriateness and procedural correctness of 
bureaucratic acts in the Customs and Indirect Taxes Administration. 
To what extent can network properties shed light on the differences in 
the democratizing potential of the individual projects? Table 4 summarizes the 
comparative analysis. It appears that the development of trust among the 
participants is crucial for a network to shape the attitudes of its participants.16 
Trust is important in order to make open exchange possible which allows for the 
discussion of sensitive questions such as access to information for journalists. It 
becomes evident that democratic socialization is facilitated if interaction takes 
                                                            
16 There exists a quite comprehensive literature on trust in professional networks, see for instance 
Fox (1974: 362); Kramer (1999); and Rhodes (2006: 18). 
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place in a less politicized environment such as the environment. In politicized 
fields such as competition policy, in turn, it appears as if participants are 
socialized into democratic principles and practices if interaction is particularly 
dense. 
Table 4. Comparison of Network Properties 
 Customs 
duty 
Competition Health 
control 
Environment 
Regression results for individual Twinning projects (cf. Tables IV in Annex) 
Effect 
(dimension) 
No 
significant 
effect 
Significant 
conditional 
effect 
(accountability)
Significant 
conditional 
effect 
(participation)
Significant 
conditional 
effect 
(transparency). 
Significant 
independent 
effect 
(participation) 
Properties of the individual Twinning projects 
Size 
 
Large 
(2 ministries,      
4 departments) 
Small 
(1 ministry,           
1 department) 
Medium 
(1 ministry,         
2 departments     
plus provincial 
departments) 
Medium 
(1 ministry,          
5 departments) 
Duration Long 
(18 months) 
Short 
(9 months) 
Medium 
(13 months) 
Long 
(19 months) 
Politicization High High Medium Low 
 
Whereas the Twinning project on customs duty (a high degree of politicization) 
yields no significant democratizing effect at all, the environment project (a low 
degree of politicization) is significantly influential in shaping attitudes toward 
democratic governance. Interviews on site with participants and my own 
observations confirm that in less politicized fields the participants enjoy more 
room for maneuver and are less suspicious toward external actors. If the 
interaction setting is, however, politicized, a small number of participants still 
seems to ensure intense and trustworthy interaction and thus to enable democratic 
socialization. The Twinning project on competition is apparently likewise 
successful in socializing participants into democratic governance despite a high 
degree of politicization. The reports of participants demonstrate that they got to 
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know one another as individuals and gained mutual confidence in each other. The 
duration of the network, that is the length of the contact, appears to have no 
considerable influence on its ability to shape the participants’ democratic mindset. 
Whereas participation in the Twinning project on customs duty generates no 
significant influence despite its long duration, the short duration of the Twinning 
project on competition was sufficient to shape the participating state officials’ 
attitudes toward democratic governance, if they had previously stayed in a foreign 
democratic country. 
The regression analysis further reveals the possibility that participation in 
Twinning activities can generate a significant negative effect if state officials use 
foreign media products for political information.17 However, this is only the case 
for state officials who participated in the project on competition and on health 
control, respectively. State officials that benefitted from the project on 
environmental matters, in contrast, are positively influenced if they use foreign 
media (see Annex IV). Moreover, foreign media penetration is influential on a 
state official’s attitude toward the concept of democratic governance if she 
worked on competition or on environment. If she is employed in the field of 
health control, it only shapes the attitude toward the transparency component of 
democratic governance.  
A glance at Table 4 points to the possible explanation that the degree of 
politicization determines how information on democratic governance provided by 
foreign media is perceived. It appears that democratic modes of governance are 
not perceived as a threat to the regime’s authority in non-politicized fields which 
provide public goods, such as the environment. Rather, state officials might 
understand how important democratic governance is for the well-being of the 
population. In politically sensitive fields, however, democratic governance is 
likely to be perceived as extremely disturbing by officials serving in authoritarian 
regimes. This might also explain why foreign media broadcasts increase the 
aversion of state officials employed in the field of health control to transparent 
governance. They could be alienated by how far-reaching transparency can be 
when even internal governmental material is made available to the public and 
what consequences this would have if applied at home. These interpretations are, 
however, only tentative and warrant further study. 
Conclusion 
This article has explored the democratizing potential of functional cooperation 
between the administrations of both established democracies and authoritarian 
regimes. More precisely, it has sought to detect whether the ENP Twinning 
                                                            
17 Again, neither the use of foreign media nor participation in Twinning activities alone yields 
such an effect. 
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projects as a form of functional cooperation positively shape attitudes toward 
democratic governance of the state officials involved, as a consequence of joint 
problem-solving and social interaction. The results are of relevance for 
policymaking and academic research alike; they not only provide room for a more 
optimistic view of the effects of functional cooperation as yielding subtle 
processes of democratization but also challenge the hitherto predominantly 
negative findings of the effects of socialization in and through international 
institutions. 
In terms of theory, the present article is relevant for predominantly two 
strands of literature: research on processes of socialization and research on the 
diffusion of transnational norms. The article speaks to research on socialization in 
that it explores processes of international socialization in a context in which a 
confounding effect of national socialization can largely be excluded or the effect 
of national socialization should counterbalance the effect of transnational 
socialization, respectively. Since an effect of functional cooperation on the 
attitudes of state officials toward democratic governance could be demonstrated 
by the present study, the question arises whether subtle processes of changes in 
attitude toward transnational norms could not also happen in alternative contexts, 
including those already explored such as the European Commission and UN 
assemblies – and whether research into socialization is far from being an 
‘exhausted’ research program (Pollack 1998; Schimmelfennig 2003). Second, the 
present article enriches existing research on the diffusion of transnational norms. 
It not only introduces, with transgovernmental networks, a hitherto neglected 
transmitter of transnational norms as an empirical subject for research, but also 
explores explicitly the micro foundation of the argument for diffusion. The 
negative results on socialization in democratic principles through foreign media 
and stays abroad cast doubt on current knowledge about the diffusion of norms 
through transnational exchange.  
Three main findings concerning the democratizing potential of functional 
cooperation in Morocco have emerged from the study presented here. First, 
functional cooperation can, under the condition of a prior stay abroad, socialize 
state officials into democratic governance. It thus holds the promising potential of 
planting the seeds for change inside authoritarian regimes as it significantly 
shapes the participants’ attitudes toward democratic modes of decision making. 
Whether and under what conditions the planted seeds, that is a positive attitude 
toward democratic governance, will grow in daily administrative practices 
warrants further study. It also remains to be seen whether such democratic 
administrative governance will ultimately spill over into the general polity by 
unfolding dynamics that promote democratization rather than stabilization of the 
entire political system. In view of the recent political upheavals in the Arab world, 
it would be interesting to explore to what extent the changed political 
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environment in initially less liberalized states such as Tunisia and Egypt 
facilitates similar processes there. In Egypt institutional capacity building belongs 
to the priorities of the European Neighborhood Policy. The European Union 
specifies 14 Twinning projects between 2004 and 2010 in fields such as transport, 
tourism, and the environment that are either already closed or still running 
(European Union 2009). Moreover, Egypt is one of the first Southern 
Mediterranean countries that participates in the program ‘Support for 
Improvement in Governance and Management’ (SIGMA), launched by the EU in 
2008 and jointly implemented with the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). This program centers on the reform of administrative 
decision-making processes. The news that state officials were participating in the 
protests in early 2011 in Egypt and partly quitting their jobs support such 
optimistic readings of this study’s results.  
The findings, however, also reveal that democratic socialization through 
cooperation in the sector is most significant in those dimensions of democratic 
governance that are most relevant in that specific sector. This finding strengthens 
the functional argument of democratic socialization as a side effect of technical 
problem-solution patterns. In particular the analysis of the Twinning project on 
the environment demonstrates that explicit reference to democratic elements in 
joint policy development is very successful in transferring democratic norms. It 
would be interesting to see to what extent this finding can be generalized to policy 
reform programs other than the EU Twinning project. Importantly, however, 
when used as a direct strategy for the promotion of democracy, functional 
cooperation risks losing its political innocence and, thus, its potential to initiate 
subtle processes of democratization. Nevertheless it seems as if the European 
Commission will continue to develop its neighborhood policy in this direction. 
Inter-administrative cooperation has recently been presented as pivotal to the new 
strategy toward the Southern Mediterranean countries by Catherine Ashton, High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, , 
in an article published in The International Herald Tribune on 26 February 2011. 
What she describes as ‘detailed, unglamorous, work on the ground’ (Ashton 
2011) – in cooperation with civil servants, local communities, the police, army 
and judiciary –is also a core part of the EU Commission’s March 2011 
communication on a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the 
Southern Mediterranean. It explicitly refers to inter-administrative cooperation 
programs such as Twinning projects to support the ‘consolidation of change’ 
(European Commission 2011: 5/6). Twinning projects are transgovernmental 
networks that implement functional cooperation at the level of state 
administration. 
A third finding suggests that a low degree of politicization of the policy 
issues facilitates democratic socialization and that a high degree of politicization 
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can be counterbalanced by intense cooperation among a small number of 
participants. The finding on the importance of the degree of politicization for 
democratic socialization in transgovernmental networks points to the limits of 
functional cooperation as a strategy for the promotion of democracy. It seems as if 
functional cooperation needs to take place in a setting that allows for open 
exchange about democratic principles and practises of decision making. However, 
the extent to which the quality of social interaction increases the likelihood of 
democratic socialization needs to be explored more rigorously. Further studies are 
required in order to make a statement relating to what extent not only the quality 
of social interaction but also the general degree of political liberalization increases 
or decreases, respectively, the likelihood of socialization in democratic 
governance through functional cooperation.  
This study presents an analysis of the democratizing potential of 
functional cooperation. In so doing, it takes a novel perspective that 
acknowledges the possible side effects of a cooperation that is demanded by the 
authoritarian elites, and enjoys the scope for intense exchange between Western 
democracies and authoritarian regimes. Socialization into democratic governance 
through functional cooperation deserves further exploration – in particular in view 
of the fact that all instruments and strategies adopted by external actors to directly 
promote democracy (apart from intervention by force) are condemned to fail 
toward stable authoritarian regimes where the incumbent rulers show little 
inclination to concede their power. 
 
 
 
 
 
27
Freyburg: Functional Cooperation and Democratic Socialization
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
 
 
 
ANNEX 
Ia. Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variable 
 Participation Transparency Accountability Democratic Governance 
Max. 
value 
5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Min. 
value 
2.50 2.25 2.00 2.83 
Mean 4.30 4.04 3.84 4.06 
Median 4.50 4.00 4.00 4.11 
S.D. .578 .427 .672 .382 
Skewness -.751 -.547 -.635 -.570 
Descriptive statistics. Values range between 1 (non-democratic) to 5 
(democratic); N = 110, cases with missing values excluded listwise; S.D. = 
standard deviation. 
 
Ib. Descriptive Statistics – Independent Variables 
 Cooperation Admin. Socialization 
Stay 
abroad 
Foreign 
Media 
Previous 
Programs 
Mean .56 .61 .42 .79 .53 
Median 1 1 0 1 1 
Frequencies   ‘0’ 44.4 61.5 57.8 207. 46.7 
                      ‘1’ 55.6 38.5 42.2 79.3 53.3 
Standard deviation .407 .488 .496 .407 .501 
      
(1) Cooperation 1.00     
(2) Admin. 
socialization 
-.018 1.00    
(3) Stay abroad .051 .170* 1.00   
(4) Foreign media .201** .194* .071 1.00  
(5) Previous 
programs 
.080 .158* .158* .198** 1.00 
Descriptive Statistics. Frequencies in percentage; N = 135, cases with missing 
values excluded listwise. One tailed p-value of non-parametric Spearman-Rho 
coefficients;*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01. 
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II. Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis 
  Factors/dimensions  
  Participation Transparency Accountability  
 Indicators/items Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. h2
1 'A civil servant should take 
into account the views and 
concerns of affected citizens 
before making decisions’ 
.981*** .104 -.050 .035 -.063* .027 .873 
2 'A civil servant should offer 
updated information on 
governmental policy’ 
.433** .168 .051 .127 .250 .178 .386 
3 'A civil servant should ensure 
that the citizens’ views and 
concerns have an influence on 
shaping policies’ 
.644** .226 .126 .155 .128 .215 .585 
4 'A civil servant should work in 
a manner that is transparent 
and comprehensible for the 
general public’ 
.119 .198 .568** .186 .242 .217 .476 
5 'A civil servant should provide 
citizens with the possibility of 
advancing their views as an 
input for governmental 
decision making' 
.299 .196 .459** .147 .261 .179 .542 
6 'A civil servant should make 
information available to 
anyone requesting it' 
-.063 .063 .878*** .169 -.134 .128 .762 
7 ‘Monitoring by independent 
state institutions ensures the 
appropriateness and 
procedural correctness of 
bureaucratic acts’ 
-.012 .058 -.068 .094 .814*** .203 .653 
8 ‘Possibilities for the general 
public and its associations to 
request scrutiny of the 
decision-making process and 
review of policies ensures the 
appropriateness and 
procedural correctness of 
bureaucratic acts’ 
.028 .169 .001 .106 .437* .176 .205 
Eigenvalues 1.498 0.868 3.316  
Variance explained (%) 18.73 10.85 41.45  
Factor loading matrix. N = 148; Est. = factor loading (estimator), S.E. = 
standard error, h2 = communality; factor loadings >.40 are displayed in bold; *p 
≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. 
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 III. Regression Results for Individual Dimensions of Democratic Governance 
 (1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4) 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
Cooperation .195 
(.102) 
.194 
(.105)† 
.004 
(.977) 
.437 
(.168)** 
 
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.137 
(.103) 
-.145 
(.103) 
-.145 
(.103) 
-.153 
(.105) 
Stay abroad  -.112 
(.108) 
-.350 
(.165)* 
.350 
(.165)* 
-.092 
(.108) 
Foreign media  -.187 
(.131) 
-.137 
(.129) 
-.137 
(.129) 
-.138 
(.129) 
Previous programs  .237 
(.109)* 
.228 
(.107)* 
.228 
(.107)* 
.242 
(.111)* 
Coop x 1: stay 
abroad 
  .433 
(.212)* 
  
Coop x 1: no stay 
abroad 
   -.433 
(.212)* 
 
R2  .028 .098 .130 .130 .072 
AIC 426.984 1014.939 1011.245 1011.245 848.356 
Log Likelihood -
210.492 
-500.470 -497.623 -497.623 -
418.178 
N 133 121 121 121 121 
T
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y 
Cooperation -.113 
(.075) 
-.103 
(.079) 
   
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.005 
(.083) 
  .007 
(.080) 
Stay abroad  -.041 
(.083) 
  -.045 
(.082) 
Foreign media  .013 
(.097) 
  -.014 
(.094) 
Previous programs  .204 
(.080)* 
  .201 
(.080)* 
R2  .016 .071   .056 
AIC 351.751 935.610   767.177 
Log Likelihood -
172.875 
-460.805   -
377.589 
N 132 121   121 
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III. Regression Results … (continued) 
  (1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4) 
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 
Cooperation .049 
(.684) 
.004 
(.128) 
   
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.034 
(.116) 
  -.034 
(.116) 
Stay abroad  -.072 
(.121) 
  -.072 
(.119) 
Foreign media  .063 
(.166) 
  .064 
(.154) 
Previous programs  .253 
(.117)* 
  .253 
(.117)* 
R2 .001 .044   .044 
AIC 437.730 994.128   834.799 
Log Likelihood -
215.865 
-490.064   -
411.399 
N 126 117   117 
Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). Regression coefficients are 
unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; † p ≤ .065, 
*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01. 
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IVa. Regression Results - The Twinning ‘Customs Duty’  
 (1) (2) 
D
em
oc
ra
tic
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e Twinning -.142 (.122) -.183 (.129) 
Admin. Socialization  -.053 (.073) 
Stay abroad  -.055 (.074) 
Foreign media  -.047 (.089) 
Previous programs  .232 (.077)** 
R2 .013 .111 
AIC 159.791 671.043 
Log Likelihood -76.895 -328.522 
N 110 103 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
Twinning -.246 (.221) -.344 (.211) 
Admin. Socialization  -.156 (.100) 
Stay abroad  -.095 (.105) 
Foreign media  -.129 (.128) 
Previous programs  .247 (.108)* 
R2 .017 .103 
AIC 299.589 897.002 
Log Likelihood -146.794 -441.501 
N 133 121 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 
Twinning -.234 (.145) -.206 (.153) 
Admin. Socialization  .003 (.081) 
Stay abroad  -.050 (.081) 
Foreign media  -.002 (.091) 
Previous programs  .199 (.079)* 
R2 .030 .081 
AIC 238.359 832.669 
Log Likelihood -116.180 -409.334 
N 132 121 
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 
Twinning -.037 (.144) -.083 (.157) 
Admin. Socialization  -.039 (.115) 
Stay abroad  -.075 (.118) 
Foreign media  .072 (.153) 
Previous programs  .256 (.116)* 
R2 .000 .045 
AIC 313.781 886.563 
Log Likelihood -153.891 -436.282 
N 126 117 
Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). Regression coefficients are 
unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; *p ≤ .05, 
**p ≤ .01. 
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IVb. Regression Results – The Twinning ‘Competition’ 
 (1) (2) (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d) 
De
m
oc
ra
tic
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
Twinning .256 
(.122)* 
.207 
(.088)* 
.444 
(.098)*** 
.161 
(.091)† 
.037 
(.097) 
.037 
(.076)*** 
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.038 
(.074) 
-.034 
(.074) 
-.034 
(.074) 
-.045 
(.074) 
-.045 
(.074) 
Stay abroad  -.055 
(.074) 
-.062 
(.076) 
-.062 
(.076) 
-.075 
(.078) 
.075 
(.078) 
Foreign media  -.068 
(.089) 
-.055 
(.091) 
.055 
(.091) 
-.053 
(.089) 
-.053 
(.089) 
Previous 
programs 
 .230 
(.077)** 
.233 
(.077)** 
.233 
(.077)** 
.231 
(.077)** 
.231 
(.077)** 
Twin. x 1: 
foreign media 
  -.283 
(.130)* 
   
Twin. x 1: no 
foreign media 
   .283 
(.130)* 
  
Twin. x 1: stay 
abroad 
    .341 
(.125)** 
 
Twin. x 1: no 
stay abroad 
     -.341 
(.125)** 
R2  .027 .105 .110 .110 .116 .116 
AIC 104.445 615.834 405.490 405.490 464.593 464.593 
Log Likelihood -49.222 -300.917 -194.745 -194.745 -224.296 -224.296 
N 110 103 103 103 103 103 
Pa
rt
ici
pa
tio
n 
Twinning .150 
(.124) 
.188 
(.154) 
    
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.144 
(.105) 
    
Stay abroad  -.095 
(.108) 
    
Foreign media  -.147 
(.130) 
    
Previous 
programs 
 .254 
(.112)* 
    
R2  .004 .077     
AIC 233.461 837.395     
Log Likelihood -133.731 -411.697     
N 133 121     
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 
Twinning .172 
(.141) 
.067 
(.118) 
    
Admin. 
Socialization 
 .009 
(.080) 
    
Stay abroad  -.045 
(.082) 
    
Foreign media  -.014 
(.095) 
    
Previous 
programs 
 .203 
(.081)* 
    
R2  .010 .058     
AIC 172.917 774.551     
Log Likelihood -83.459 -380.276     
N 132 121     
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IVb. Regression Results … (continued) 
  (1) (2) (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d) 
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 
Twinning .259 (.203) 
.201 
(.183) 
-.038 
(.188) 
.664 
(.273)* 
  
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.025 
(.115) 
-.038 
(.116) 
-.038 
(.116) 
  
Stay abroad  -.070 
(.118) 
-.120 
(.122) 
.120 
(.122) 
  
Foreign media  .061 
(.153) 
.083 
(.150) 
.083 
(.150) 
  
Previous 
programs 
 .262 
(.117)* 
.268 
(.016)* 
.268 
(.116)* 
  
Twin. x 1: stay 
abroad 
  .702 
(.331)* 
   
Twin. x 1: no 
stay abroad 
   -.702 
(.331)* 
  
R2 .011 .051 .070 .070   
AIC 282.603 586.600 702.004 702.004   
Log Likelihood -138.302 -421.300 -343.002 -343.002   
N 126 117 117 117   
Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). Regression coefficients are unstandardized; 
standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; † p ≤ .08, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ 
.01, ***p ≤ .001. 
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IVc. Regression Results – The Twinning ‘Health Control’  
 (1) (2) (3a) (3b) 
D
em
oc
ra
tic
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
Twinning -.032 (.071) .014 (.081)   
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.047 (.076)   
Stay abroad  -.051 (.079)   
Foreign media  -.062 (.089)   
Previous 
programs 
 .222 (.078)**   
R2  .001 .089   
AIC 215.990 728.534   
Log Likelihood -104.995 -357.267   
N 110 103   
Pa
rt
ici
pa
tio
n 
Twinning -.054 (.101) .063 (.122) -.169 (.168) .266 (.149) 
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.161 (.110) -.139 (.108) -.139 (.108) 
Stay abroad  -.098 (.111) -.185 (.131) .185 (.131) 
Foreign media  -.143 (.130) -.181 (.132) -.181 (.132) 
Previous 
programs 
 .246 (.113)* .251 (.111)* .251 (.111)* 
Twin. x 1: stay 
abroad 
  .435 (.217)*  
Twin. x 1: no 
stay abroad 
   -.435 (.217)* 
R2  .001 .073 .094 .094 
AIC 357.259 959.985 900.858 900.858 
Log Likelihood -175.630 -472.992 -442.429 -442.429 
N 133 121 121 121 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 
Twinning -.133 (.090) -.155 (.090)† .144 (.131) -.208 (.103)* 
Admin. 
Socialization 
 .020 (.080) .011 (.080) .011 (.080) 
Stay abroad  -.028 (.083) -.008 (.086) -.008 (.086) 
Foreign media  -.002 (.097) .045 (.107) -.045 (.107) 
Previous 
programs 
 .193 
(.080)** 
.188 
(.080)** 
.188 
(.080)** 
Twin. x 1: 
foreign media 
  -.352 (.174)*  
Twin. x 1: no 
foreign media 
   .352 (.174)* 
R2  .013 .076 .089 .089 
AIC 280.348 878.066 735.132 735.132 
Log Likelihood -137.174 -432.033 -359.566 -359.566 
N 132 121 121 121 
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IVc. Regression Results … (continued)  
  (1) (2) (3a) (3b) 
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 
Twinning .075 (.122) .127 (.133)   
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.048 (.118)   
Stay abroad  -.084 (.122)   
Foreign media  .055 (.158)   
Previous 
programs 
 .262 (.117)*   
R2 .002 .050   
AIC 377.908 950.349   
Log Likelihood -185.954 -468.174   
N 126 117   
Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). Regression coefficients are 
unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; †p ≤ .06, 
*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01. 
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IVd. Regression Results – The Twinning ‘Environment’  
 (1) (2) (3a) (3b) 
De
m
oc
ra
tic
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
Twinning .179 (.081)* .163 (.094) -.248 (.117)* .195 (.096)* 
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.015 (.072) -.018 (.072) -.018 (.072) 
Stay abroad  -.039 (076) -.025 (.078) -.025 (.078) 
Foreign media  -.093 (.092) -.120 (.097) .120 (.097) 
Previous 
programs 
 .208 
(.077)** 
.217 
(.077)** 
.217 
(.077)** 
Twin. x 1: 
foreign media 
  .442 
(.161)** 
 
Twin. x 1: no 
foreign media 
   -.442 
(.161)** 
R2  .030 .111 .122 .122 
AIC 195.533 695.634 493.798 493.798 
Log Likelihood -94.767 -340.634 -238.899 -238.899 
N 110 103 103 103 
Pa
rt
ici
pa
tio
n 
Twinning .438 
(.091)*** 
.401 
(.103)*** 
  
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.093 (.102)   
Stay abroad  -.094 (.104)   
Foreign media  -.178 (.127)   
Previous 
programs 
 .183 (.107)   
R2  .092 .140   
AIC 360.973 948.425   
Log Likelihood -177.487 -467.213   
N 133 121   
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 
Twinning .035 (.101) .121 (.084) -.043 (.081) .393 (.148)** 
Admin. 
Socialization 
 .026 (.081) .012 (.079) .012 (.079) 
Stay abroad  -.040 (.082) -.106 (.089) .106 (.089) 
Foreign media  -.029 (.095) .012 (.096) .012 (.096) 
Previous 
programs 
 .186 (.080)* .174 (.079)* .174 (.079)* 
Twin. x 1: stay 
abroad 
  .436 
(.169)** 
 
Twin. x 1: no 
stay abroad 
   -.436 
(.169)** 
R2  .001 .067 .100 100 
AIC 286.390 860.657 778.467 778.467 
Log Likelihood -140.195 -423.329 -381.233 -381.233 
N 132 121 121 121 
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IVd. Regression Results … (continued) 
  (1) (2) (3a) (3b) 
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 
Twinning -.104 (.150) -.205 (.170)   
Admin. 
Socialization 
 -.069 (.122)   
Stay abroad  -.071 (.119)   
Foreign media  .100 (.154)   
Previous 
programs 
 .277 (.123)*   
R2 .004 .057   
AIC 369.190 922.311   
Log Likelihood -181.595 -454.156   
N 126 117   
Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). Regression coefficients are 
unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; *p ≤ .05, 
**p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. 
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